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In recent years, the economic interest in ethnolinguistic fractionalization
has increased, in part due to greater cross{border movements. Although
ethnic diversity is an omnipresent theme throughout history, economists
are only recently starting to pay attention to it. Journalists pay attention
to ethnic diversity mostly when it erupts into bloodshed, although ethnic
fractionalization does not automatically, nor exclusively, imply ethnic
con°ict. The recent literature has claimed that cross{country di®erences
in ethnic diversity explain a substantial part of cross{country di®erences in
public policies, political instability and other economic factors associated
with long{run growth (see Easterly and Levine 1997). Political economy
models suggest that polarized societies will be both prone to competitive
rent{seeking by di®erent groups and have di±culty agreeing on public
goods like infrastructure, education and good policies (Alesina and Drazen
1991; Slheifer and Vishny 1993; Alesina and Spoloare 1997). Alesina and
Drazen (1991) describe how a war of attrition between interest groups can
postpone macroeconomic stabilization. Alesina et al. (1999) present a model
linking heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a city to the
amount and type of public goods the city supplies. Results show that the
shares of spending on productive public goods are inversely related to the
city's ethnic fragmentation. Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1999) and
Alesina et al.1 (2003), amongst others, show that ethnic fractionalization
is negatively correlated with measures of infrastructure quality, literacy and
school attainment.
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization appears to be responsible for a variety
of corruption{related phenomena (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Svensson 2000).
Svensson (2000) and Mauro (1995) ¯nd that corruption is higher the higher
ethnic diversity. Svensson (2000) also ¯nds that corruption increases where
there is more foreign aid in an ethnically{divided society although this is not
the case in an ethnically{homogeneous one. In Shleifer and Vishny (1993)
corruption may be particularly damaging when there is more than one bribe-
taker. If each independent bribe-taker does not internalize the e®ects of
her/his bribes on the other bribe-takers' revenues, then the result is more
bribes per unit of output and less output. Ethnically{diverse societies may
be more likely to yield independent bribe-takers, since each ethnic group
have responsibility for a region or ministry in the power structure. For
this reason Mauro (1995) regresses growth on corruption assuming an index
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrumental variable to test the
hypothesis that more fractionalization (and therefore more corruption) is
1These results are very strong in regressions without income per capita (which may be
endogenous to ethnic fractionalization). They lose some of their signi¯cance where on the
right hand side one checks for GDP per capita.
1associated with lower economic growth2.
The literature has thus stressed the negative role of ethnic fragmentation
on corruption and thus on economic growth. But alongside this negative
role, there is the possibility of a positive role for ethnic diversity. In fact as
Alesina and La Ferrara say (2003):
\ Is ethnic diversity \good" or \bad" from an economic point of view,
and why? Its potential costs are fairly evident. Con°ict of preferences,
racism, prejudices often lead to policies which are suboptimal from the point
of view of society as a whole, and to the oppression of minorities which
can explode in war or least in disruptive political instability. But an ethnic
mix also brings about variety in abilities, experiences, cultures which may be
productive and may lead to innovation and creativity. The United States are
the quintessential example of these two faces of racial relations in a \melting
pot". "
Analogously to Tº angeras and LagerlÄ of (2009), the role of the degree of
ethnic diversity of a country (i.e. the number of ethnic groups) has been
explored to describe and explain an economic phenomenon. While Tº angeras
and LagerlÄ of's analysis is related to the probability of the occurrence of a
civil war, we discuss the level of corruption of a country and its relationship
with ethnic fragmentation. In particular, we contribute to this debate by
analyzing how ethnolinguistic fractionalization can in°uence the extent of
corruption.
We stress that this work does not aim at providing policies to reduce
corruption or allow growth to increase. We propose a descriptive model
since, as Collier (1998) and Alesina et al. (2003) emphasize, it is hard
to see any policy implications arising from fractionalization, because there
is little that a country can legitimately do about its ethnic composition
without a®ecting other non{economic variables which are not the object of
this study.
In our model, we rely on a society populated by bureaucrats, controllers
and entrepreneurs, producing a single good. The population is fractionalized
in n di®erent ethnic groups. A theoretical game is constructed as follows: the
entrepreneur has to choose between the traditional sector and the modern
sector. We assume that the modern sector has higher productivity than the
traditional sector. In order to enter the modern sector, the entrepreneur
has to request a license from the bureaucrat. In fact, like Yoo (2008),
we also assume that the entrepreneur must acquire bureaucrats approval
for the project. The bureaucrat can ask the entrepreneur for a bribe in
exchange for providing the license. The entrepreneur can accept or refuse
to pay the bribe. Moreover, we consider the presence of monitoring activity.
2\Sociological factors may contribute to rent-seeking behavior. An index of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (societal divisions along ethnic and linguistic lines) has
been found to be correlated with corruption. Also, public o±cials are more likely to do
favors for their relatives in societies where family ties are strong". Mauro (1997)
2Monitoring activity is related to the intervention of the controllers in order
to penalize illegal interactions between entrepreneurs and bureaucrats.
In our work, the optimal monitoring level is endogeneously derived. We
assume that ethnic fractionalization has two opposite e®ects: on the one
hand, it increases the cost of monitoring but, on the other hand, high ethnic
fractionalization generates an increase in the probability of being reported,
because the controller reports the corrupt transaction only if the bureaucrat
and/or entrepreneur belong to a di®erent ethnic group from that of the
controller. Indeed, for certain levels of ethnic diversity, fragmentation takes
on a positive role in controlling corruption because it increases the level of
control between di®erent ethnic groups.
The ¯ndings of the present paper are comparable to the ones in Tº angeras
and LagerlÄ of (2009): indeed, in both cases the in°uence of the degree of
ethnic diversity seems to be more powerful when the country is neither
homogeneous nor highly fragmented. The common root of these results can
be found in the presence of two competitive e®ects due to the number of
ethnic groups. In particular, in our paper the e®ect of monitoring corruption
is low either in homogeneous or very fragmented countries, while it is high
when the level of ethnic diversity is intermediate.
In this context, we also ¯nd a non-linear relationship between ethnic
diversity, corruption and growth: in fact homogeneous and fragmented
societies are characterized by high corruption and low economic growth.
In the middle range of ethnic diversity, the ethnic factor acts as a \control"
on corruption thus producing greater economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the model and the related theoretical game. In section 3 the relationship
between the monitoring level, corruption and economic growth is studied.
In section 4, using the results of the previous sections, we endogeneize the
monitoring level of controllers and we prove that a non-linear relationship
between fractionalization - via corruption - and growth exists. Section 5
concludes.
2 The theoretical game model
Let us consider an economy producing a single homogeneous good composed
of a continuum of 3 types of agents: bureaucrats, controllers and
entrepreneurs. The controllers monitor entrepreneurs' behavior in order
to weed out or reduce corruption. Firms manufacture a homogeneous
product y using either one of two technologies3 with constant return to scale:
the modern sector technology and the traditional sector technology. Each
3As in Li, Xu and Zou (2000) an agent can produce in either the traditional or the
modern sector. Productivity in the modern sector is greater than that in the traditional
sector. The advantage of the traditional sector is that it is not subject to expropriation,
while that of the modern sector is. The rationale is that entrepreneurs in the modern
3entrepreneur is assumed to have the same quantity of capital k. The product
may either be manufactured for consumption purposes or for investment
purposes. The modern sector technology is:
y = aMk (1)
In order to obtain their license, the entrepreneurs need to submit a project
to the Public Administration. The entrepreneur may access the traditional
sector without any license being issued by the Public Administration. In
this case the output is:
y = aTk (2)
From here on, it will be assumed that aM > aT and therefore that the
modern sector is more pro¯table than the traditional sector.
The bureaucrat receives a salary w4. In this model, the bureaucrat may
decide to issue a license only in exchange for a bribe. Since the gross pro¯t
resulting from the investment in the modern sector is higher than the one
in the traditional sector, the entrepreneur may ¯nd it worthwhile to o®er
a bribe to the corrupt bureaucrat in order to obtain the necessary license
to access the modern sector. We assume that the bureaucrat is the only
one who may issue the required license and that he may refuse to issue the
license with no need to provide any reasons or explanations in granting the
license. The bureaucrat may decide not to ask for a bribe and to issue the
license to all those who submit a project, or s/he may decide to ask for a
bribe in exchange for such a license. The State monitors entrepreneurs { via
controllers { in such a way that qi is the probability that the entrepreneur
belonging to the i-th ethnic group is reported. In our model, we assume that
only the entrepreneur detected in a corrupt transaction will be punished.
The entrepreneurs are not homogeneous agents and they incur a di®erent
reputation cost. More precisely, the j-th entrepreneur attributes a subjective
value cjk to the objective punishment when the corrupt transaction is
detected,5 where cj 2 [0;1].
sector must obtain permits and licenses and are vulnerable to the e®ects of corruption.
This hypothesis could be interpreted by regarding the modern sector as an innovative
sector (e.g. telecommunications) which is still in need of State regulation.
4It is assumed that no arbitrage is possible between the public and the private sector
and that therefore there is no possibility of the bureaucrats becoming entrepreneurs, even
if their salary w were lower than the entrepreneur's net return. This happens because the
bureaucrat individuals in the population have no access to the capital markets, but only
a job, and therefore may not become entrepreneurs.
5The punishment for the entrepreneur is not a constant, but rather a function of the
investment. In this case, based on the statements of Rose - Ackerman (1999): \On the
other side of the corrupt transaction, a ¯xed penalty levied on bribers will lower both the
demand for corrupt services and the level of bribes. However, it will have no marginal
impact once the briber passes the corruption threshold. To have a marginal e®ect, the
penalties imposed on bribe payers should be tied to their gains (their excess pro¯ts, for
example)". pp. 55. The punishment for the entrepreneur is considered as a function of
the investment determining the size of the pro¯ts.
4The controller must monitor the entrepreneur's behavior and s/he puts
a level of monitoring m in place. Since the pioneer work of Allport on the
theory of prejudice and following the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and
Turner, 1986) early work established that patterns of intergroup behavior
can be understood considering that individuals may attribute positive utility
to the well{being of members of their own group and negative utility to that
of members of others group (see e.g. Tajfel et al. 1971). In fact, the simply
belonging to a group can lay foundations of prejudice, judgmental biases and
intergroup discrimination towards outgroups. Following this literature, we
assume that only if the controller meets a corrupt entrepreneur belonging to
a di®erent ethnic group will s/he report the corruption. We hypothesize that
\The Department of Controllers" is divided in proportion to ethnic groups6.
Let !i 2 [0;1] the probability that an individual belongs to the i-th ethnic
group, with i = 1;:::n. Following Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), we rely
on a country where the di®erent ethnic groups are the same size. Therefore




The controller earns ®m from the State for the monitoring level m and
s/he encounters increasing di±culty in monitoring entrepreneurs as the
number of ethnic groups grows. The optimal monitoring level m will be
derived endogenously in the model and it will be a non linear function of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization n. In the rest of the paper we refer to the
entrepreneur payo® by a superscript (E) and to the bureaucrat payo® by a
superscript (B).
Our model can be formalized by introducing the following three-period
dynamic game:
(1) At stage one of the game, the entrepreneur should decide in which
sector to invest, i.e. whether to invest her/his capital in the modern
or in the traditional sector. Such a decision is tantamount to the
decision of whether to submit the project to the Public Administration,
considering that a license is needed to invest in the modern sector.
Project submission does not result in the automatic issue of the license
by the bureaucrat, in that the bureaucrat may refuse to grant the
license unless a bribe b is paid.
(1.1) If the entrepreneur decides not to submit the project (investing in
the traditional sector) the game ends and then the payo® vector





1 ) = (w;aTk): (4)
6Notice that our model does not apply if ethnic fractionalization is not re°ected also
in institutions, as it is often the case in dictatorships.
5(1.2) If the entrepreneur decides to submit the project, s/he asks the
bureaucrat to issue the license. In this case the game continues
to stage two.
(2) At stage two the bureaucrat decides7 the amount to ask for as a bribe
bd for issuing the license.
(2.1) If the bureaucrat, facing an entrepreneur who has submitted a
project, decides not to ask for a bribe (bd = 0) for issuing the






2 ) = (w;aMk): (5)
(2.2) If the bureaucrat decides to negotiate the payment of a bribe
(bd > 0) with the entrepreneur in order to obtain the license, the
game continues to stage three.
(3) At stage three, the entrepreneur should decide whether to negotiate
the bribe to be paid to the bureaucrat or to refuse to pay the bribe.
Should s/he decide to enter into negotiation with the bureaucrat, the
two parties will ¯nd the bribe corresponding to the Nash solution to a
bargaining game bNB and the game ends. The payo®s will depend on
whether the i-th entrepreneur is reported (with probability qi) or not.






3 ) = (w;aTk): (6)
Then the game ends.
(3.2) Otherwise the negotiation starts. Let bNB be the ¯nal equilibrium












It should be noted that in this model ¼2 is preferred to ¼3 by both agents,
and therefore the bureaucrat will never ask for a bribe which s/he knows that
the entrepreneur would turn down. When a controller monitors a corrupt
transaction, s/he decides to charge for it only if the entrepreneur belongs
to a di®erent ethnic group from that of the controller. The probability of
a controller, belonging to the i-th ethnic group, meeting an entrepreneur
7The bureaucrats, if indi®erent as to whether to ask for a bribe or not, will prefer to
be honest.
6belonging to the i-th ethnic group as well, will be equal to 1
n. Then qi is
the probability of the entrepreneur belonging to the i-th ethnic group being
reported and it derives from the probability of being monitored (m) and
from the probability of the controller belonging to an ethnic group di®erent
from i. Then






; 8i = 1;:::;n: (8)
The optimum level of m derives from maximization by the controller of
her/his own expected payo® (see paragraph 4).
3 The solution of the game
This game may be solved by backward induction, starting from the last
stage of the game. The bribe resulting as the Nash solution to a bargaining
game in the last subgame should be determined. This bribe is the outcome
of a negotiation between the bureaucrat and the entrepreneur, who will be
assumed to share a given surplus on an equal basis. We ¯rst determine the
equilibrium bribe (bNB) (see Appendix A for the proof).
Proposition 3.1. Let q 6= 1.8 Then there exists a unique non negative bribe
bNB








Proposition 3.1 shows that, when the equilibrium is reached, the
entrepreneur gives half of the surplus to the bureaucrat, such a surplus being
the di®erence in the expected return on the investment in the two di®erent
sectors (modern and traditional), net of the entrepreneur's expected costs
for being detected in a corrupt transaction.
Remark 3.2. We notice that a straightforward computation gives that
the equilibrium bribe bNB
j is increasing with respect to the probability of
being detected in a corrupted transaction. Therefore, increasing q, reduces
the potential surplus that the bureaucrat and entrepreneur can share, thus
reducing the bribe.
3.1 The static equilibrium
The game has been solved in Appendix B by using the backward induction
method starting from the last stage of the game. Its solution is formalized
by the following proposition.
8If q = 1 this stage of the game is never reached.
7Proposition 3.3. Let 0 ·
(aM¡aT)
q = c± · 0. Then,

















this is the payo® vector connected to equilibrium C (see below);
(b) if cj 2 (c±;1] then the equilibrium payo® vector is:
¼2 = (w;aMk) (11)
this is the payo® vector connected to equilibrium NC (see below).
The previous proposition shows that we obtain two perfect Nash
equilibria in the sub-games, depending on the parameter values:
² Equilibrium C: if cj · c±, the di®erence in gross pro¯ts between the
modern sector and the traditional sector is such as to make up for the
expected cost of corruption. Thus, the surplus to be shared between
the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat will keep a negotiation going, the
outcome of which is the bribe corresponding to the Nash solution to a
bargaining game;
² Equilibrium NC: if cj > c±, i.e. the \shame cost" is so high that the
entrepreneur would turn down a request for a bribe. Realizing this
fact, the bureaucrat will refrain from asking for a bribe for issuing the
license. Thus the entrepreneur will enter the modern sector and will
not be asked for a bribe by the bureaucrat.
There are two ranges of cj which correspond to di®erent corruption levels:
in fact, in equilibrium C corruption is widespread, while it is absent in
equilibrium NC.
As we said, our model assumes that reputation costs may vary across
di®erent entrepreneurs (cj for the j{th entrepreneur), re°ecting di®erent
individual ethical, moral and religious values or denoting a greater or lesser
sense of their own impunity. In fact, the j-th entrepreneur attributes a
subjective value to the objective punishment { depending on her/his own
\shame e®ect" { when the corrupt transaction is detected. This argument
applies to each ethnic group.
The cumulative density of probability, de¯nes the distribution of individual
costs F(cj), where j is the speci¯c entrepreneur. This function represents
the fraction of entrepreneurs who agree to be corrupted when ethnolinguistic
fractionalization is n. We assume that the distribution of entrepreneurs'
costs is of the Kumaraswamy type with real parameters ®1 and ®2. This
choice is reasonable, because the shape of the Kumaraswamy density
8function changes as the values of ®1 and ®2 vary9. Therefore, this
probability law is suitable for describing di®erent types of entrepreneurs'
ethical behaviors. More speci¯cally, if 1 < ®2 < ®1, then the shape of the
distribution function is asymmetric to the right, describing entrepreneurs
with a high shame e®ect. Conversely, when 1 < ®1 < ®2, then we have
asymmetry to the left, and the entrepreneurs have a low shame e®ect.




®1 ¢ ®2c®1¡1(1 ¡ c®1¡1)®2¡1dc = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ c
®1
j )®2: (12)
Given the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs, their behavior will be in°uenced
by their own reputation cost cj.
In this hypothesis the j-th entrepreneur has a di®erent reputation cost
cj and, then,








is the fraction of entrepreneurs belonging to the i-th ethnic group with a
reputation cost cj · c±.








is the fraction of entrepreneurs belonging to the i-th ethnic group with a
reputation cost cj > c±.
Di®erently with respect to the static case, in a dynamic context, as we will
see in the next section, corruption in°uences the accumulation of capital by
entrepreneurs, and thus economic growth.
3.2 Dynamic equilibrium
The game perspective is now expanded to review the dynamic consequences
of corruption on growth and, therefore, on investment, while analyzing the
entrepreneur's behavior in this respect. As noted, a manufactured product
may be either consumed C or invested
²






Each entrepreneur maximizes utility over an in¯nite period of time subject






9We also point out that if ®1 = ®2 = 1, then the Kumaraswamy distribution reduces
to the uniform distribution.
9sub
²
k = ¦E ¡ C; (17)
where C is consumption, ½ is the discount rate in time and ¦E is the return
on the investment for the entrepreneur.
Since ¦E is di®erent across equilibria, the problem is solved for the two
cases10.
This model predicts that the j-th entrepreneur belonging to the i-
th ethnic group will have only one optimum equilibrium { and only one
corresponding growth rate { depending on her/his own reputation cost.
² The entrepreneur with a reputation cost cj · c±, will ¯nd it worthwhile
to be corrupted and then the optimal equilibrium will be C. In this















² The entrepreneur with a reputation cost cj > c±, will ¯nd it worthwhile
to be honest and then, the optimal equilibrium will be NC. In this
equilibrium, the entrepreneur will obtain a constant consumption




[aM ¡ ½]: (19)
Furthermore, it can easily be demonstrated that capital and income also
have the same growth rate11.
Then, at aggregate level, we obtain a income growth rate (°) weighting
over di®erent growth rates for corresponding entrepreneurs. Then, in the
equilibrium C, there will be F(c±) corrupted entrepreneurs, each with
her/his own growth rate °C
j ; in the equilibrium NC there will be [1¡F(c±)]














































10In the interest of brevity, we report the computation of the growth rate in Appendix
D.
11See Appendix E for the proof.
10By substituting c± = aM¡aT


































A straightforward computation gives that
@°
@q > 0. This means that the
growth rate of the economy increases as the probability of being reported
grows. In the next section we will show how this relationship works, by
considering an endogeneous optimal monitoring level.
4 Endogenous monitoring
As we said, q is the probability of being reported and it derives from the
probability m of being monitored and from the probability 1 ¡ 1=n of the
entrepreneur belonging to a di®erent ethnic group from that of the controller
(see formula (8)).
So far, we have taken monitoring level m as exogenous, but now we make
the analysis more realistic, considering that the monitoring level set by the
controller results from maximization of her/his payo® Vm:
Vm = ®m ¡ C(n;m): (22)
where ®m are the bene¯ts of a certain monitoring level m for the controller
and C(n;m) are monitoring costs, dependent on n and m.
The optimum level of m, named m¤, is derived by maximization of the
controller's expected payo® function.
The controller decides the optimal level of monitoring m¤ comparing the
marginal bene¯t (®) of a certain monitoring level with the cost of doing
it. We state some assumptions about the cost function: costs are assumed
to be null in the case of absence of monitoring, as it naturally should be.
Moreover, we assume that the marginal costs increase as the monitoring
level increases. In fact, comprehensive monitoring activity implies increased
costs, since it requires more sophisticated action and specialized knowledge
about complex corrupted transactions. As a further requirement, we
hypothesize that the costs related to a ¯xed monitoring level grow as the
ethnolinguistic fractionalization n grows. This assumption is driven by the
growing complexity of managing and controlling a large number of ethnic
groups { also considering that linguistic di±culties of monitoring members of
di®erent ethnic groups {, implying more di±cult (and expensive) monitoring
activity12.
12See, e.g., Ortega and Tº angeras (2008)
11We compound the remarks and the assumptions stated above, and we de¯ne
the costs by introducing the Orlicz functions13:
C(n;m) = g(n)M(m); (23)
where:
² g : N ! [0;+1) describes how monitoring level cost depends on the
number of ethnic groups. We point out that, in our analysis, the trivial
case of a single ethnic group is not considered, and the population is
made up of at least two di®erent ethnic groups. We can assume that
we know the value of g in the case of two di®erent ethnic groups, with
value g2 > 0. Function g is also assumed to be increasing;
² M has support in [0;1], M([0;1]) ´ [0; ¹ H], ¹ H 2 R+ and M is a
truncation of an Orlicz function as follows:
M(x) := 1fx2[0;1]g ¢ ¡(x);
where 1A is the usual characteristic function of the set A and ¡(x) is
an Orlicz function such that ¡(1) ´ M(1) = ¹ H. We assume that the
kernel function of ¡, named h, is strictly increasing.
The highest monitoring level is attained for m = 1. In this case the cost
function is:
C(n;1) = g(n) ¹ H;
and it depends on the ethnolinguistic fractionalization within the country
in that it depends on the term g(n).
The function Vm of the monitoring activity, for the controller, is maximized




= ® ¡ g(n)h(m¤) = 0:
Since h is strictly increasing, then there exists the inverse function h¡1. We
assume hereafter the following condition for the weights g(n).
8n 2 N ) g(n) ¸ ®h(1): (24)
Condition (24) states that the cost adjustment factor g(n) is not less than
a certain threshold depending on the monitoring costs and the marginal
bene¯t of monitoring.








13For the concept of Orlicz functions and kernels, see Appendix F.
12By considering the continuous version of the function g : [0;+1) ! [0;+1),
assuming that g is di®erentiable and replacing the discrete variable n with








since g is increasing respect to n.
Thus, the assumption that g is increasing implies that the optimal
monitoring level decreases as the number of ethnic groups grows. This is due
to the fact that the monitoring costs grow as the number of ethnic groups
increases.
By substituting the optimal m¤ of (25) into (8), we ¯nd the optimal













Then the optimal probability of being reported q¤ depends on
ethnolinguistic fractionalization through two channels:
(1) the optimal monitoring level: as ethnic diversity increases, we have
shown that the monitoring cost also increases and thus the optimal
monitoring level m¤ declines;
(2) the probability of the entrepreneur belonging to a di®erent ethnic
group from that of the controller: as the number of ethnic groups
increases, the probability of the entrepreneur belonging to the same
ethnic group decreases. Therefore the probability of the entrepreneur
belonging to a di®erent ethnic group from that of the controller
increases.
More intuitively, on the one hand as ethnic diversity increases, the
monitoring cost increases and then the optimal monitoring level decreases,
thus optimal q¤ decreases. On the other hand, as ethnic diversity increases,
the probability of the entrepreneur belonging to a di®erent ethnic group
from that of the controller increases. Uniting these two opposite channels
we will show (see theorem 4.1.) that there is a threshold value of ethnic
diversity n¤ where the probability of being reported reaches a maximum.
For lower fractionalization levels, i.e. before n¤, the probability of being
reported q¤ increases with respect to ethnic diversity n. Indeed, the
increase in the probability of being reported { due to the fact that the
bureaucrat and/or entrepreneur belong to a di®erent ethnic group from that
of the controller { overtakes the reduction in monitoring level { due to the
increasing monitoring cost {. For high fractionalization levels, i.e. after
n¤, the growing monitoring costs overtake the increase in the probability of
13being reported.
These results are re°ected in the aggregate growth rate. We de¯ne by °¤
the growth rate computed at the optimal monitoring level m¤ (and so at the
































We measure the corruption level with the fraction of corrupted
entrepreneurs, given by (13). By substituting (27) into (13), we have:








This formula shows that, before n¤, as ethnic diversity increases, corruption
{ via increasing probability of being reported q¤ { decreases; conversely,
after n¤ as ethnic diversity increases, corruption also increases, due to the
decreasing probability of being reported q¤.
In the next result, the previous arguments are formalized:



























for n < n¤:
(32)
Then n¤ is the unique absolute maximum point for q¤ and for °¤, and it is
the unique minimum point for (c±).
For the proof see Appendix G.
In Theorem 4.1, we showed that ethnolinguistic diversity increases the
monitoring activity level, up to a critical ethnolinguistic threshold n¤. In this
case, the growth rate increases and the corruption level declines. For high
fractionalization levels, i.e. after n¤, the growing monitoring costs reduce
the monitoring level and thus economic growth.
14Moreover, the dynamic analysis shows a U-curve between ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and the growth rate. Indeed, we showed that, in the
case of very fragmented countries or, conversely, in a homogeneous society,
the economy has a low growth rate and widespread corruption, while in
intermediate fragmented countries, the economy has a high growth rate and
limited corruption.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have analyzed the in°uence of cultural and ethnic factors
on the spread of corruption. The theoretical and empirical literature
has stressed how greater ethnolinguistic fractionalization can produce
greater corruption; in our model, on the other hand, we have shown that
intermediate ethnolinguistic fractionalization makes the control system more
incisive on the bureaucrat's behavior, and thus might reduce corruption.
A theoretical game model is presented, in order to explore the
relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization, corruption and the
growth rate. Very general conditions on the model's parameters are
assumed. In particular, we state that the reputation costs follow a
Kumaraswamy distribution, which belongs to the family of two{parameter
distribution but, di®erently from the Beta law, it is explicitly tractable from
a mathematical point of view.
We ¯nd an ethnolinguistic threshold n¤ such that before n¤ the growth
rate grows and the corruption level declines. For higher fractionalization
levels, i.e. after n¤, the growing monitoring costs drive growing corruption
and a low economic growth and monitoring level.
The dynamic analysis shows a U-curve between ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and the growth rate: in the case of a high level of n or,
conversely, in a homogeneous society, the economy has a low growth rate,
while in the middle of the range of ethnic diversity, the economy has a high
growth rate and limited corruption.
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¢ ) be the vector of the di®erences in the payo®s
where ¼4 is the agreement about the bribe and where ¼3 is disagreement
between bureaucrat and entrepreneur. The bribe bNB associated to the










b2<+ f[aMk ¡ (1 ¡ q)b ¡ qcjk ¡ aTk] ¢ [w + (1 ¡ q)b ¡ w]g; (34)
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of ¼¢ and where
[aTk;w] is the point of disagreement, i.e. the payo®s that the entrepreneur
and the bureaucrat respectively would obtain if they did not come to an
agreement. Since the objective function is concave with respect to b, a











(aM ¡ aT)k(1 ¡ q) ¡ cj(1 ¡ q)k ¡ 2b(1 ¡ q)2 = 0 )
2b(1 ¡ q)2 = (aM ¡ aT)k(1 ¡ q) ¡ cj(1 ¡ q)k )
bNB =
·




that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame, 8q 6= 1.
B Appendix
The static game is solved with the backward induction method. Starting
from stage 3, the entrepreneur needs to decide whether to negotiate with
the bureaucrat. Both payo®s are then compared, because the bureaucrat
asked for a bribe.





3 ) (aM)k ¡ (1 ¡ q)bNB ¡ cjkq > aTk (36)
i.e. the entrepreneur payo® negotiated is greater than her/his payo® in
the case of refusal. Since under a perfect information hypothesis, the
16entrepreneur knows the ¯nal equilibrium bribe bNB then we substitute













that is veri¯ed 8q · aM¡aT
cjq = q±.
Notice that in order to have an admissible probability set, q must





Moreover, if the entrepreneur's surplus in investing in the modern
sector rather than in the traditional one is smaller than the expected





Conversely, if the pro¯tability of investing in the modern sector is
greater than the expected reputation costs, then q± > 1 and the
entrepreneur is corrupted, independently of the value of q. We assume
that q± = aM¡aT
qcj · 1: Generally, if q · q± the entrepreneur negotiates
the bribe, while if q > q± s/he refuses the bribe.
(2) Going up the decision{making tree, at stage two the bureaucrat decides
whether to ask for a bribe.
² Let q > q± then the bureaucrat knows that the entrepreneur will
not accept any bribe so s/he will be honest and s/he will pursue the
license without any bribe.
² Let q · q± then the bureaucrat knows that if s/he asks for a bribe
then the entrepreneur will enter into negotiation and the ¯nal bribe






2 ) w + (1 ¡ q)bNB ¡ qcjk > w
i.e. the bureaucrat payo® if asking for a bribe is greater than her/his
payo® if s/he does not ask for a bribe. By substituting bNB in the
previous inequality and simplifying the previous inequality, we obtain
aM ¡ aT > cjq
that holds 8q ¸ q±. So we can conclude that if q · q± then the
bureaucrat asks for the bribe bNB and the entrepreneur accepts.
17(1) At stage one the entrepreneur has to decide whether to submit the
project.
² Let q > q± then the entrepreneur knows that if s/he submits a project






1 ) aM < aT
The previous inequality is always veri¯ed by hypothesis.
² Let q · q± then the entrepreneur knows that the bureaucrat will ask
for the bribe bNB which s/he will accept. So, at stage one, s/he has
to decide whether to invest in the modern sector. S/he will not invest












aM ¡ aT ¡ qcj > 0 (39)
that is always veri¯ed.
C Appendix























The Hamiltonian function H(C;k;¸) is :

















































In equilibrium NC, the entrepreneur's pro¯t is:
¦NC
E = aMk (46)
thus the constraint is:
²
k = aMk ¡ C (47)
The Hamiltonian function H(C;k;¸) is :
H = e¡½tC1¡¾ ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¾
+ ¸[aMk ¡ C] (48)
A straightforward computation gives the following expression for the




[aM ¡ ½] (49)
D Appendix





















k is constant, then the di®erence between both terms on the right
should also be constant, and because aM, aT, c and q are constant, then C
and k should grow at the same rate. Similarly, since y = aMk, at a steady
state income grows at the same rate as capital. The same applies in the case
of equilibrium NC.
E Appendix
M : [0;+1) ! [0;+1) is an Orlicz function if and only if it is continuous,
convex and nondecreasing in [0;+1), M(0) = 0, M(x) > 0 for x > 0
and lim
x!+1
M(x) = +1. Krasnoselskii and Rutitsky (1961) proved a
representation theorem, stating that given an Orlicz function M, there exists





19and h(t) is right-di®erentiable for t ¸ 0, h(0) = 0, h(t) > 0 for t > 0, h is
non-decreasing and lim
t!+1
h(t) = +1. h is known as the kernel of the Orlicz
function M.
F Appendix





















































; K 2 R+:
A straightforward computation then gives






Returning to the discrete variable n, and imposing the boundary condition
g(2) = g2, we have that g(n¤) can be written as in (30), with K given by
(31) and
n¤ 2 f[x¤];[x¤] + 1gjq(n¤) = maxfq([x¤]);q([x¤] + 1)g:
By hypothesis (32), we have that n¤ is the unique absolute maximum point
for q¤.
The optimal growth rate °¤ can be written as °¤(n) := °(q¤(n)). Directly
by formula (28), we observe that a straightforward computation gives that
°¤ has the same behavior of q¤, i.e. it has a unique maximum point in n¤
as well.










The coe±cient of (q¤)0(n) in (51) is negative, and so n¤ is the unique
minimum point for (c±)¤.
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